

# REMUNERATION REPORT FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND SUPERVISORY BOARD PURSUANT TO § 162 OF THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (AKTG) FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2022

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Basic components of the Executive Board remuneration system	2
Fixed remuneration	2
Basic salary	2
Supplementary benefits	2
Pension commitment	2
Variable remuneration	3
Annual bonus	3
Performance cash award	5
Remuneration of the current members of the Executive Board	6
Development of business and impact on Executive Board remuneration	6
Remuneration disclosure	6
Explanations on fixed remuneration	9
Explanations on variable remuneration	9
Annual bonus	9
Performance cash award	10
Explanations on multi-year variable remuneration in the financial year 2019	11
Share deferral (2019)	11
Performance cash award 2019	11
Other information	12
Remuneration of former Executive Board members	15
Remuneration of Supervisory Board members	15
Supervisory Board remuneration system	15
Remuneration received by the individual members of the Supervisory Board:	16
Comparative chart of remuneration and earnings trend	18

## BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD REMUNERATION SYSTEM

The Supervisory Board has adjusted the remuneration of the Executive Board, effective from the financial year 2019, to the methodology described in this remuneration report. The remuneration system pursuant to Section 120a (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) was submitted to the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on July 8, 2020, and approved by the majority of 98.56 %. The remuneration system applied to all active Executive Board members in the financial year 2022 and to all former Executive Board members since 2019.

The remuneration of the members of the Executive Board is determined by their tasks and their own individual performance as well as by the success of the company. The amount of remuneration is based overall on the level customary in the comparable business environment. The Supervisory Board had an external consultant review the appropriateness of the Executive Board's compensation in fiscal year 2022. In the most recent comparison, the peer group used were companies belonging to the German "SDAX", Deutsche Börse AG's small-cap index to which Salzgitter AG belong to.

Executive Board remuneration is made up of fixed remuneration consisting of a basic salary, supplementary benefits and a pension commitment, along with variable remuneration (cf. Figure 1):

Figure 1: Overview of the components of Executive Board remuneration

### FIXED REMUNERATION

Basic salary
Supplementary benefits
Pension commitment

### VARIABLE REMUNERATION

Annual bonus (one-year)	50 % short term	Performance cash award (multi-year)	Long-term
> 70 % financial target	50 % long-term share-based	> 70 % financial target	
> 30 % non-financial target		> 30 % non-financial target	

## FIXED REMUNERATION

### BASIC SALARY

The basic salary is granted in the form of an amount of money per year individually agreed between the Supervisory Board and the respective Executive Board member in the Executive Board member's employment contract. The basic salary is to be paid out in twelve identical equal monthly instalments at the end of the month respectively (monthly salary).

### SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS

Supplementary benefits consist of benefits in kind, such as granting the private use of a company car, expenses for a collective accident insurance, assuming of the costs of medical check-ups, as well as benefits in kind subject to flat rate taxation.

### PENSION COMMITMENT

The company pension commitments vary:

For the period up until December 31, 2018, all Executive Board members in active service for the company at the time received a commitment for payment of a pension the amount of which depends on the length of service to the Group and is capped at a maximum of 60 % of the fixed basic salary (commitment to pension benefits). The pension commitments in favor of Executive Board members Becker and Kieckbusch existing as of December 31, 2018, were formalized as of this date. As from January 1, 2019, these commitments were supplemented by defined contribution commitments, as described in the following.


For the period starting January 1, 2019, Executive Board members Burkhard Becker and Michael Kieckbusch, as well as Mr. Groebler as from the date when he took up his employment, received the commitment that the company will make certain amount of money available on a pension account (defined contribution commitment) for each year of Executive Board service. The annual pension contribution currently amounts to k€ 342 for Mr. Groebler and k€ 210 for Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch (until 2021: k€ 180). In addition, a guaranteed annual interest credit that depends on the respectively valid statutory maximum technical interest rate applicable to the life insurance industry (guaranteed interest rate) in accordance with the actuarial reserve ordinance (DeckRV) will also be taken account of on the pension account. The amount is invested in accordance with the life cycle model defined under the conditions for deferred compensation in the Salzgitter Group (SZAG model), while taking account of the securities determined by the Investment Committee for the company pension scheme within the Salzgitter Group. If higher interest after tax is generated by the funds invested, the amount will be credited when pension payments begin.

If an Executive Board member leaves the service of the company before reaching retirement age under the statutory retirement pension scheme, the Board member will receive the plan assets on the pension account as a one-off retirement lump sum or, upon application, in ten annual instalments. If an Executive Board member leaves the service of the company without having reached retirement age, the Board member will be granted a vested entitlement to the pension account in accordance with the statutory provisions of the German Occupational Retirement Provision Act. Upon request, the Executive Board member will receive early retirement capital, at the age of 62 at the earliest.

**VARIABLE REMUNERATION**

Variable remuneration presupposes the achieving of targets. This remuneration consists, on the one hand, of an annual bonus, and of a performance bonus (performance cash award) on the other. A target bonus is agreed in the Executive Board employment contract for the annual bonus, and a target amount for the performance bonus (cf. Figure 2).


Figure 2: Overview of the variable remuneration components



**ANNUAL BONUS**


The precondition for the disbursement of an annual bonus is split as follows: 70 % for achieving a financial performance target, measured on the basis of earnings before taxes (EBT), and 30 % for individual performance, measured by qualitative criteria determined by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of each year and pertaining to the respective year (cf. Figure 3).

Figure 3: Annual bonus system



The payout multiplier for the EBT performance target is calculated by comparing the EBT of the respective financial year with the EBT of the preceding financial year (cf. Figure 4). If EBT remains the same compared with the previous year, the multiplier is 100 % of the target bonus agreed in the executive employment contract. If EBT is raised by 50 % compared with the previous year, the maximum multiplier of 150 % is applied. If EBT is -50 % compared with the previous year, the minimum multiplier of 50 % is applied. Linear interpolation is applied if objectives are achieved between the fixed intervals. If the minimum multiplier is not achieved, the multiplier is 0 %. If EBT is negative for the second time in a row, or if EBT in the previous year or in the current financial year is less than € 1 million respectively, the Supervisory Board can determine the degree to which goals have been achieved at their own discretion. The same applies if an exceptional event occurs due to which the Executive Board member receives a higher or lower disbursement amount than he would have been entitled to had this exceptional event not taken place, without this having been warranted by the Board member's performance. If a positive EBT is achieved in the previous financial year and a negative EBT in the current financial year, the multiplier is 0 %.


Figure 4: Bonus curve – EBT target annual bonus



In setting the criteria for individual performance the Supervisory Board may factor in a series of different aspects, such as strategic corporate development, specific projects, occupational safety and employee development. After a financial year has ended, the individual performance is assessed by the Supervisory Board using the predefined criteria. The degree to which targets have been achieved can be determined by the Supervisory Board on a linear basis between 0 % and 150 %.

The annual bonus is paid out at 50 % after the respective financial year has ended (one-year variable remuneration). The remaining 50 % (initial value) of the annual bonus is retained and converted into virtual shares of the company (share deferral) for a three-year period (lockup period) that commences at the end of the respective financial year (share deferral, cf. Figure 5). The number of virtual shares is calculated from the arithmetic average of the Salzgitter share's Xetra closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 30 trading days prior to the beginning of the lockup period. Upon expiration of the lockup period, the number of virtual shares is multiplied by the arithmetic average of the Salzgitter share's Xetra closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 30 days before the end of the lockup period, plus the fictitious dividend payments on the virtual shares, and paid out. The resulting payout amount is capped at 150 % of the initial value.

Figure 5: Share deferral system



In the event of exceptional, unforeseeable developments, the Supervisory Board may reduce the annual bonus at its own discretion.

The annual bonus is structured to be an incentive for implementing the company's strategic direction. In the opinion of the Supervisory Board, a key parameter for measuring the success of the corporate strategy and the company's long-term development consists of the earnings before taxes (EBT) achieved for the respective year. The Supervisory Board has therefore selected the achieving of stable or improved EBT measured against the previous year as the principal performance criterion for granting the annual bonus.

Along with this criterion, the Supervisory Board is of the opinion that non-financial criteria also have an effect on the success of the corporate strategy and the company's long-term good development. The Supervisory Board has therefore defined additional, annual performance criteria for the granting of the annual bonus. The Executive Board remuneration system thus also makes a definitive contribution to promoting the corporate strategy and the long-term development of the company.

Transferring part of the annual bonus to a share deferral component with a lockup period of three years promotes the corporate strategy and the company's long-term development by incentivizing the Executive Board members to increase the enterprise value and by directly aligning the interests of the Executive Board with those of the shareholders, as well as enhancing the company's attractiveness in the capital market. Share deferral therefore promotes the long-term development of the company.

**PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD**

The precondition for the disbursement of a performance cash award is also split at 70 % for achieving a financial performance target, in this case measured by the return on capital employed (ROCE = EBIT I [= EBT + interest expenses excl. interest portion in transfers to pension provisions]) divided by the sum of shareholders' equity (excl. calculation of deferred tax), tax provisions, interest-bearing liabilities), tax provisions, interest-bearing liabilities (excl. pension provision) as well as liabilities from finance leasing and forfeiting] expressed as an average of a four-year performance period, and at 30 % for achieving stakeholder objectives, set by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of each year for the respective performance period (cf. Figure 6).

Figure 6: Performance cash award system



The average of the ROCE figures achieved after the end of the respective financial years during the performance period is used to calculate the payout amount for the ROCE performance target.

The average of the budgeted ROCE figures of the respective financial years is then deducted from this amount.


The resulting difference between the target figure and actual figure in percentage points is compared with the figures fixed by the Supervisory Board at the start of the respective performance period for a multiplier of 100 % (target figure), of 50 % (minimum figure) and of 200 % (maximum figure) of the target amount agreed in the respective Executive Board member's employment contract, taking account of the general development of business and the economic prospects of Salzgitter AG. Linear interpolation is applied if objectives are achieved between the fixed intervals. If an unusual event or an unusual development result in an Executive Board member receiving a

higher or lower payout amount compared with the amount that he would have been entitled to if this event or development had not occurred, without this being attributable to the performance of the respective Executive Board member, the Supervisory Board can raise or lower the payout amount.

If the minimum figure is not reached, the payout multiplier is 0 %. Exceeding the maximum figure will not increase the payout multiplier.

Example: If the target figure for the difference between the average ROCE achieved and the average budgeted ROCE is set at 0 %, with a minimum set at -3 % and a maximum figure of 2 %, the multiplier is 100 % of the target amount assuming that the exact amount of the budgeted ROCE is achieved. If ROCE is one percentage point higher than budgeted, the multiplier will be 150 %. If ROCE is one percentage point lower than budgeted, the multiplier will be 83.33 %.

Figure 7: Example of bonus curve - ROCE target performance cash award



In setting the stakeholder objectives the Supervisory Board may factor in a series of different aspects, such as strategic corporate development, specific projects, occupational safety and employee development. Achieving the targets is assessed by the Supervisory Board after the performance period has ended. The degree to which targets have been achieved can be determined by the Supervisory Board on a linear basis between 0 % and 200 %.

The performance cash award is paid out at the end of the respective performance period.

The performance cash award is designed to provide incentives for implementing the company's strategy. One of the Group's key control parameters for the success of the corporate strategy and its long-term successful development is the achieving of return on capital employed (ROCE) that can be considered an indicator of whether and to what extent investments are eligible for implementation to promote sustainable growth. For this reason, the Supervisory Board has selected the achieving of the planned ROCE in the performance period as the principal performance criterion for the performance cash award.

Along with this criterion, the Supervisory Board is of the opinion that non-financial criteria also have an impact on the success of the corporate strategy and the company's long-term sound development. With regard to granting the performance cash award, the Supervisory Board therefore additionally determines stakeholder goals per year. The Executive Board remuneration system thus also makes a definitive contribution to promoting the corporate strategy and the long-term development of the company.

## REMUNERATION OF THE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

### DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS AND IMPACT ON EXECUTIVE BOARD REMUNERATION

In the financial year 2022, a year indelibly marked by massive geopolitical turbulence, the Salzgitter Group delivered a new sales record and the second-best operating result in the company's history. Factors determining the success included the outstanding results of the Steel Production and Trading business units. The Steel Processing and Technology business units also made gratifying contributions, however, as did the participating investment in Aurubis AG. Whereas, in the first six months of the year, the rapid increase in steel prices definitively bolstered this trend, the second half of the year presented a market environment impacted by energy prices at record levels and deep uncertainty, accompanied by declining steel prices. Based on earnings after taxes of € 1,085.4 million, return on capital employed is calculated at 20.1 % (ROCE; 2021: 16.2 %).

In accordance with the remuneration system, the gratifying development of all financial ratios directly impacts the achieved and expected amount of the Executive Board's performance-related

variable remuneration components. Owing to another considerable increase of around € 540 million in the pre-tax result, the performance target that depends on the development of EBT has been fulfilled to the maximum target achievement of 150 %. The unexpectedly high and significantly above budget ROCE of the financial year 2022 has also resulted in an increase in the degree to which targets pertaining to ROCE-related performance target are currently expected to be achieved, in particular of the performance cash award since 2019.

The end of the financial year 2022 marks the end of the lockup period and performance period of the share deferral and performance cash award granted in the financial year 2019. The payouts from these multi-year variable remuneration components have been taken into account accordingly in the 2022 remuneration granted and owed to Prof. Dr.-Ing. Fuhrmann, former Chief Executive Officer who has left the company in the financial year 2021, as well as to Executive Board members Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch. In 2021 as the comparison year, no payments pertaining to these remuneration components were yet included as the respective long-term remuneration components were only introduced effective as from the financial year 2019.

### REMUNERATION DISCLOSURE

Executive Board remuneration in the 2022 financial year corresponded to the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on July 8, 2020 (available at <https://www.salzgitter-ag.com/en/company/executive-board.html>):

Table 1 shows a breakdown of the remuneration granted and owed to the individual Executive Board members in the financial year 2022, with separate disclosures on their relative share in overall remuneration and comparison with the previous financial year. Along with the basic salaries and the supplementary benefits effectively granted in the respective financial year, the variable remuneration components are shown for each year in which they were earned (one-year variable remuneration – annual bonus (50% cash portion)) and the year in which the lockup period (multi-year variable remuneration – share deferral) and the performance period (multi-year variable remuneration – performance cash award) ends, also if disbursement is only due at a later point in time. Similarly, special compensation is also disclosed in the year to which it pertains, even if disbursement is only at a later point in time.

Table 1: Remuneration granted and owed pursuant to Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)

		Gunnar Groebler Regular member of the Executive Board from 2021/05/17 until 2021/06/30, Chief Executive Officer since 2021/07/01				Burkhard Becker Chief Financial Officer since 2011/02/01				Michael Kieckbusch Chief Personnel Officer since 2013/02/20			
		2022		2021		2022		2021		2022		2021	
In k€		absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %	absolute	in %
Fixed salary <sup>1</sup>		1140	61 %	650	45 %	771	47 %	696	65 %	651	42 %	636	62 %
Supplementary benefits		31	2 %	27	2 %	25	2 %	28	3 %	45	3 %	48	5 %
<b>Total fixed salary</b>		<b>1,171</b>	<b>62 %</b>	<b>677</b>	<b>47 %</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>48 %</b>	<b>724</b>	<b>68 %</b>	<b>696</b>	<b>45 %</b>	<b>684</b>	<b>67 %</b>
One-year variable remuneration	Annual bonus (50 % cash portion)	713	38 %	384	27 %	435	26 %	342	32 %	435	28 %	342	33 %
Multi-year variable remuneration	Share deferral	-	0 %	-	0 %	179	11 %	-	0 %	179	12 %	-	0 %
	Performance cash award	-	0 %	-	0 %	239	14 %	-	0 %	239	15 %	-	0 %
<b>Total variable remuneration</b>		<b>713</b>	<b>38 %</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>27 %</b>	<b>852</b>	<b>52 %</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>32 %</b>	<b>852</b>	<b>55 %</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>33 %</b>
Special compensation <sup>2</sup>		-	0 %	375	26 %	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %
Pension payments		-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %
<b>Total remuneration</b>		<b>1,883</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>1,437</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>1,649</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>1,066</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>1,549</b>	<b>100 %</b>	<b>1,026</b>	<b>100 %</b>

<sup>1</sup> In the financial year 2022, Mr. Becker was granted an amount of k€ 120 (2021: k€ 60) for temporarily discharging additional duties as head of the Steel Processing Business Unit (2021: Head of the Mannesmann Business Unit). The fixed salaries of Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch were raised by k€ 5 a month to k€ 58 as from October 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Groebler was entitled to special compensation, due and payable in January 2022, to cover salary losses from his former employment relationship.

Table 2 shows the contractually agreed target remuneration as well as pension expenses.

Table 2: Target remuneration figures for the financial year 2022

In k€		Gunnar Groebler Regular member of the Executive Board from 2021/05/17 until 2021/06/30, Chief Executive Officer since 2021/07/01				Burkhard Becker Chief Financial Officer since 2011/02/01				Michael Kieckbusch Chief Personnel Officer since 2013/02/20			
		2021 target	2022 target	2022 min.	2022 max.	2021 target	2022 target	2022 min.	2022 max.	2021 target	2022 target	2022 min.	2022 max.
Fixed salary <sup>1</sup>		650	1,140	1,140	1,140	696	771	771	771	636	651	651	651
Supplementary benefits		27	31	31	31	28	25	25	25	48	45	45	45
<b>Total fixed salary</b>		<b>677</b>	<b>1,171</b>	<b>1,171</b>	<b>1,171</b>	<b>724</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>684</b>	<b>696</b>	<b>696</b>	<b>696</b>
One-year variable remuneration	Annual bonus (50 % cash portion)	298	475	0	713	265	290	0	435	265	290	0	435
Multi-year variable remuneration	Share deferral	298	475	0	1,069	265	290	0	653	265	290	0	653
	Performance cash award	238	380	0	760	212	232	0	464	212	232	0	464
<b>Total variable remuneration</b>		<b>834</b>	<b>1,330</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,541</b>	<b>742</b>	<b>812</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,552</b>	<b>742</b>	<b>812</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,552</b>
Special compensation <sup>2</sup>		375	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Service cost <sup>3</sup>		338	253	253	253	402	391	391	391	451	434	434	434
<b>Total remuneration</b>		<b>2,225</b>	<b>2,754</b>	<b>1,424</b>	<b>3,965</b>	<b>1,867</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>1,188</b>	<b>2,739</b>	<b>1,877</b>	<b>1,943</b>	<b>1,131</b>	<b>2,682</b>

<sup>1</sup> In the financial year 2022, Mr. Becker was granted an amount of k€ 120 (2021: k€ 60) for temporarily discharging additional duties as head of the Steel Processing Business Unit (2021: Head of the Mannesmann Business Unit). The fixed salaries of Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch were raised by k€ 5 a month to k€ 58 as from October 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Groebler was entitled to special compensation, due and payable in January 2022, to cover salary losses from his former employment relationship.

<sup>3</sup> Service charge pursuant to IAS 19



## EXPLANATIONS ON FIXED REMUNERATION

The amount of the basic salary fundamentally corresponds to the monetary amounts individually agreed in the Executive Board employment contracts. The supplementary benefits reflect the monetary value of the benefits in kind granted in the respective employment contract, which essentially consist of the benefit derived from the private use of a company car. At this point, reference is made to the presentation in Table 1 and to the following special circumstances:

The monthly salaries of Executive Board members Becker and Kieckbusch have each been raised by k€ 5 to k€ 58 as from October 1, 2022. The Supervisory Board has examined the appropriateness of the increase in remuneration by way of an external comparison with other SDAX companies, and also by an internal comparison with the development of the remuneration of the Salzgitter Group's employees. Raising the basic salaries achieves the objective of compensating for the general increase in wages and salaries since the last adjustment to remuneration in October 2019, with the aim of continuing to grant remuneration in line with the market.

In the financial year 2022 Mr. Becker was granted an amount of k€ 120 for temporarily discharging additional duties as head of the Mannesmann Business Unit.

## EXPLANATIONS ON VARIABLE REMUNERATION

### ANNUAL BONUS

The 2022 annual bonus was calculated in accordance with the remuneration system comprising the target bonus and the multiplier (between 0 % and 150 %) agreed individually with each Executive Board member in their employment contracts. The target bonus amounted to 10 monthly salaries for all Executive Board members. The multiplier depended on fulfilling the performance criteria in the financial year 2022, specifically – as provided for under the remuneration system – 70 % of earnings before taxes (EBT) at Group level in the financial year 2022 in comparison with 2021 (the relevant performance criteria are precisely defined in the remuneration system) and 30 % depending on the individual performance in the financial year 2022, the latter measured by the criteria defined by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the financial year for all Executive Board members equally, as follows:

/ Criterion 1: Reducing the occurrence of accidents (15 %-points): Upon lowering the accident incidence rate (number of industrial accidents causing more than one day of incapacity per 1,000 employed persons on an annual average, AIR) by 5 % compared with 2021, target attainment was set at 100 %, at 50 % for lowering the accident incidence rate by 2.5 %, and at 150 % for lowering the accident incidence rate by 7.5 % or more. Linear interpolation between these minimum and

maximum values is applied to target achievement. If the accident incidence rate is reduced by less than 2.5 % compared with 2021 or rises, compared with 2021, target attainment is 0 %.

/ Criterion 2 – Digitalization (15 %-points): In the financial year 2022, a convincing concept for the digitalization of training formats and content, as well as an integrated continuous professional development concept to support employees in the context of digital transformation were to be drawn up. To the extent that two continuous professional development modules were created and already implemented in the financial year 2022, target attainment is 100 %. Assuming that three, four or five continuous professional development modules were created and implemented, the Supervisory Board defined the degree to which targets are attained at 115 %, 130 % and 150 % respectively.

### CALCULATION OF THE MULTIPLIER

#### EBT target:

In the financial year 2022, EBT rose from € 705.7 million in the financial year 2021 to € 1,245.4 million, marking an increase of more than 50 %. Target attainment is therefore calculated at 150 % for all Executive Board members.

#### Individual performance:

Re Criterion 1: An accident incidence rate of 9.96 was achieved in the financial year 2022. Compared with the accident incidence rate of 12.81 in the financial year 2021, this represents an improvement of 22.2 %. Target attainment therefore amounts to 150 %. With regard to Criterion 2, the Supervisory Board determined a target attainment of 150 % based on its assessment of the degree to which tasks were achieved. The resulting individual multiplier amounts (amounts disbursed) for the 2022 annual bonus are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Annual bonus 2022 calculations

	Target bonus	Multiplier EBT target (weighting 70 %)	Multiplier individual targets (weighting 30 %)	Weighted multiplier – total	Annual bonus 2022 (of which 50 % cash / 50 % share deferral)
Groebler	€ 950,000	150 %	150 %	150 %	€ 1,425,000
Becker	€ 580,000	150 %	150 %	150 %	€ 870,000
Kieckbusch	€ 580,000	150 %	150 %	150 %	€ 870,000

The 2022 annual bonus of each individual Executive Board member will be paid out in the financial year 2023 in accordance with the specifications of the remuneration system as follows: 50 % in cash and 50 % invested in virtual shares of the company (share deferral). The individually allocated virtual shares from share deferral 2022 are shown in Table 4. At the end of the three-year lockup period, i.e., at the start of 2026, the stock market value of the shares at that time, plus dividend disbursed during the lockup period, capped at 150 % of the initial value (50 % of the 2022 annual bonus), is to be paid out.

Table 4: Calculation of the number of virtual shares from 2022 share deferral

	Initial value share deferral (50 % of the annual bonus)	Ø XETRA closing prices	Number of virtual shares
Groeblner	€ 712,500	€ 28.41067	25,078.606
Becker	€ 435,000	€ 28.41067	15,311.149
Kieckbusch	€ 435,000	€ 28.41067	15,311.149

#### OUTLOOK FOR THE PERFORMANCE TARGETS FOR ASSESSING THE ANNUAL BONUS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2023:

The target and benchmark for the EBT financial performance target correspond to those set for the financial year 2022. With regard to assessing the individual performance, identical criteria were determined for all Executive Board members, as follows:

/ Criterion 1: Reducing the occurrence of accidents (15 %-points): Upon lowering the lost time injury frequency rate (LTIF rate: number of lost time injuries with days of incapacity per 1,000,000 hours worked) by 5 % compared with 2022, target attainment is set at 100 %, at 50 % for lowering the LTIF rate and at 150 % for lowering the LTIF rate by 7.5 % or more. Linear interpolation between these minimum and maximum values is applied to target achievement. If the reduction in the LTIF rate is less than 2.5 % compared with 2022, target attainment is 0 %. In addition, the Executive Board is required to conduct a survey on the occupational safety concept for contractor company employees and on the accidents of temporary staff deployed in Germany. If the LTIF rate of employees outsourced in Germany exceeds the LTIF rate of the domestic commercial core workforce by more than 20 %, the Supervisory Board can lower the target attainment of more than 100 % to 100 % at its own discretion.

/ Criterion 2 – Digitalization (15 %-points): The Supervisory Board defined certain target attainments of between 0 % and 150 % in detail for preparing further training modules to support digital transformation (also for commercial employees), for the comprehensive implementation of a corresponding further training concept for managers, flanked by the comprehensive digitalization of training at the Salzgitter Campus.

#### PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD

The performance cash award 2022 is calculated in accordance with the remuneration system based on the individual target amount agreed with each individual Executive Board member in their respective employment contracts and the multiplier (between 0 % and 200 %). The multiplier depends on the degree to which the performance criteria have been fulfilled in the performance period 2022 through 2025, – as laid down by the remuneration system – specifically 70 % depending on the return on capital employed (ROCE) and 30 % depending on the achievement of the stakeholder objective of “Decarbonization / SALCOS / Transition to Carbon Neutrality” determined by the Supervisory Board at the start of the financial year for all Executive Board members equally, as follows:

#### CALCULATION OF THE PAYMENT MULTIPLIER FOR THE PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD 2022

##### ROCE target:

Regarding the target attainment of the return on capital employed (ROCE target) over the performance period 2022 through to 2025, the Supervisory Board defined a target of 0 %-points, a minimum of –3 %-points, and a maximum of +2 %-points as deviation from an average ROCE budgeted at 9.8 % at the start of the financial year 2022. To obtain the multiplier at the end of the performance period – as provided for under the remuneration system – i.e., after the end of the financial year 2025, target attainment is calculated, and the multiplier determined.

##### Stakeholder objective:

The following target was set as a stakeholder objective: to ascertain the carbon footprint of the Salzgitter Group by the end of 2022 and to present the Supervisory Board with ten ambitious measures in total for the sustainable reduction of carbon emissions to be implemented incrementally over the years from 2023 through to 2025. After the end of the performance period, i.e., after the end of the financial year 2025, target attainment will be assessed depending on the number of measures presented in 2022 for lowering carbon emissions, as well as the speed with which the measures are implemented over the period from 2023 to 2025.

The performance cash award 2022 will be paid out in cash after the end of the performance period from 2022 through 2025.

#### OUTLOOK FOR THE PERFORMANCE TARGETS FOR MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2023:

Regarding the ROCE financial performance target weighted at 70 %, the Supervisory Board defined the following over the performance period from 2023 to 2026: 0 %-points, a minimum of -3 %-points and a maximum of +3.5 %-points as deviation given an average ROCE budgeted at 7.8 %.

Regarding Stakeholder Objective 1 "Improving the ESG rating" weighted at 15 %, the target defined over the performance period from 2023 through to 2026 consisted of participation in selected sustainability certifications and projects and of developing and implementing concepts that contribute to improving the Salzgitter Group's ESG rating. Target attainment will be assessed depending on the quality of the concepts developed, the certification results delivered, as well as the rankings that the Salzgitter Group achieves in the relevant ESG ratings.

Regarding Stakeholder Objective 2 "Expanding Scrap Recycling" with a weighting of 15 %, the target defined was to set in place a scrap strategy that would contribute to the steady expansion of the available scrap volumes in the grade required for the SALCOS project. Target attainment will be assessed depending on the additional scrap volumes that can be brought to the implementation stage through the respective measures over the performance period from 2023 through 2026.

#### EXPLANATIONS ON MULTI-YEAR VARIABLE REMUNERATION IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2019

The end of the financial year 2022 marked the conclusion of the lockup period and the performance period of the multi-year variable remuneration granted to the Executive Board in the financial year 2019. The respective amounts disbursed are included in the remuneration granted and owed for the financial year 2022 (cf. Table 1).

#### SHARE DEFERRAL (2019)

The calculation of the amounts disbursed from Share Deferral 2019 is shown in Table 5. The virtual shares allocated to each Executive Board member from the individual Annual Bonus 2019 are multiplied by the arithmetic average of the Salzgitter share's Xetra closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 30 days before the end of the lockup period, plus the fictitious dividend payments on the virtual shares, and paid out. The resulting amount disbursed is limited to 150 % of the initial value.

Table 5: Calculation of the amount disbursed from Share Deferral 2019

	Share deferral initial value	Starting share price	Number of virtual shares	Closing share price	Dividend payouts during the lockup period	Share deferral disbursement amount
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Fuhrmann	€ 225,000	€ 18.73900	12,007.044	€ 28.41067	€ 0.75	€ 337,500
Becker	€ 119,250	€ 18.73900	6,363.733	€ 28.41067	€ 0.75	€ 178,875
Kieckbusch	€ 119,250	€ 18.73900	6,363.733	€ 28.41067	€ 0.75	€ 178,875

#### PERFORMANCE CASH AWARD 2019

The performance cash award 2019 is calculated in accordance with the remuneration system based on the target amount agreed with each individual Executive Board member in their respective employment contracts and the multiplier (between 0 % and 200 %). The multiplier depends on the degree to which the performance criteria have been fulfilled in the performance period 2019 through 2022, – as laid down by the remuneration system – specifically 70 % depending on ROCE and 30 % depending on the achievement of the stakeholder objectives determined by the Supervisory Board at the start of the financial year 2019 for all Executive Board members equally.

#### ROCE target:

Regarding the target attainment of the return on capital employed (ROCE target) over the performance period 2019 through 2022, the Supervisory Board defined a target of 0 %-points, a minimum of -3 %-points, and a maximum of +2 %-points at the start of the financial year 2019 as deviation from an average ROCE budgeted at 8.2 % over the performance period. If the deviation between ROCE achieved on average and budgeted on average, between minimum and target value and between target and maximum value, the multiplier will be calculated by way of interpolation. The arithmetic mean of the ROCEs achieved in the financial years from 2019 through 2022 amounts to 6.7 % (2019: -5.8 %, 2020: -3.9 %, 2021: +16.2 %, 2022: +20.1 %), the deviation between ROCE achieved on average and budgeted on average ROCE is therefore -1.5 %-points, and the multiplier for the ROCE target is therefore 75 %.

**Stakeholder objectives:**

The Supervisory Board defined the sustainable reduction in accident occurrence (Stakeholder Objective 1) and the sustainable stepping up of continuous professional development (Stakeholder Objective 2), each weighted at 15 %, as stakeholder objectives over 2019 – 2022 performance period.

The achieving of Stakeholder Objective 1 was to be assessed on the basis of the average of the annual rate of change in the accident incidence rate over the 2019 – 2022 performance period, with the rate of change in 2019 pertaining to domestic operations and, as from 2020 on a worldwide basis as well, to be incorporated into the average. In the event of a 2.5 % reduction in the accident incidence rate, target attainment was set at 50 %, for a reduction of 5 % at 100 %, and for a reduction of 7.5 % or more at 200 %. No target attainment would be ascertained if the reductions were less than 2.5 %.

Stakeholder objective 2 was to be assessed based on whether a minimum of 60 % in the financial year 2019, a minimum of 80 % in the financial year 2020, and 100 % in the financial year 2021 of the domestic workforce had taken part in at least one training measure. A participant rate of 100 % worldwide was to have been achieved in the financial year 2022. Inasmuch as the prescribed participant rates are only achieved in two or three financial years, target attainment was set at 50 % and 75 % respectively. If all the targets were achieved within the prescribed period, target attainment would be deemed fulfilled at 100 %. If one or two of the annual targets were each to be achieved prematurely one year earlier, target attainment was set at 150 % and 200 %, respectively.

Taking account of the results listed in Table 6, the Supervisory Board ascertained target attainment of Stakeholder Objective 1 at 200 % and of Stakeholder Objective 2 at 200 %.

Table 6: Stakeholder objectives – Performance Cash Award 2019

	Stakeholder Objective 1 (accident occurrence) <sup>1</sup>			Stakeholder Objective 2 (continuous professional development) <sup>2</sup>		
	AIR previous year	AIR	Change	Participant rate target	Participant rate actual	Target attainment
2019	17.81	13.67	-23.2 %	60 %	80.53 %	in period
2020	13.63	11.33	-16.9 %	80 %	88.40 %	prematurely
2021	11.33	12.81	13.1 %	100 %	99.64 %	in period
2022	12.81	9.96	-22.2 %	100 %	99.13 %	prematurely
Ø			-12.3 %			

<sup>1</sup> 2019: Assessment on the basis of the accident incidence rate domestic, as from 2020: assessment on the basis of the accident incidence rate worldwide.

<sup>2</sup> 2019-2021: Assessment on the basis of participant rate domestic, 2022: assessment on the basis of participant rate worldwide.

The resulting amounts for disbursement for the Performance Cash Award 2019 are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Calculation of the Performance Cash Award 2019

	Target	Multiplier ROCE target (weighting 70 %)	Multiplier stakeholder objectives (weighting 30 %)	Weighted multiplier - total	Performance cash award
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Fuhrmann	€ 400,000	75.00 %	200 %	112.50 %	€ 450,000
Becker	€ 212,000	75.00 %	200 %	112.50 %	€ 238,500
Kieckbusch	€ 212,000	75.00 %	200 %	112.50 %	€ 238,500

**OTHER INFORMATION**

The option under the remuneration system of reclaiming variable remuneration components was not utilized as there was no occasion or the preconditions to justify this.

The maximum remuneration under the remuneration system stands at k€ 2,900 for regular Executive Board members and at k€ 5,100 for the Chairman of the Executive Board. A conclusive assessment as to whether the defined maximum remuneration was adhered to can only be made at the end after the amounts from the respective share deferrals and performance cash awards are determined and will therefore be reported in the remuneration report for the financial year 2025.

In the financial year 2019, the maximum remuneration determined for the financial year 2019 of k€ 5,100 for the Chief Financial Officer and of k€ 2,900 for the regular Executive Board Members – also taking account of the amounts meanwhile disbursed from the multi-year variable remuneration components – have been adhered to (cf. Table 8).

Table 8: Adherence to the maximum remuneration for the financial year 2019 (including the multi-year variable remuneration granted and owed in the financial year 2022)

In k€		Prof. Dr.-Ing. Fuhrmann Chief Financial Officer from 1996/10/01 until 2011/01/31, Chief Executive Officer from 2011/02/01 until 2021/06/30	Becker Chief Financial Officer since 2011/02/01	Kieckbusch Chief Personnel Officer since 2013/02/20
Fixed remuneration		1,155	609	609
Supplementary benefits		18	27	43
<b>Total fixed salary</b>		<b>1,173</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>652</b>
One-year variable remuneration <sup>1</sup>	Annual bonus (50 % cash portion)	225	169	119
Multi-year variable remuneration	Share deferral	338	179	179
	Performance cash award	450	239	239
<b>Total variable remuneration</b>		<b>1,013</b>	<b>587</b>	<b>537</b>
Special compensation		-	-	-
Service cost <sup>2</sup>		616	372	401
<b>Total remuneration</b>		<b>2,801</b>	<b>1,594</b>	<b>1,589</b>
<b>Maximum remuneration</b>		<b>5,100</b>	<b>2,900</b>	<b>2,900</b>

<sup>1</sup> The one-year variable remuneration of Mr. Becker includes k€ 50 for the additional temporary assumption of the position of Managing Director of the Group company KHS GmbH.

<sup>2</sup> Service charge pursuant to IAS 19

No benefits were granted or pledged by external parties to the individual members of the Executive Board in the financial year 2022 for their activities as Executive Board members.

In the event of regular termination of their service to the company, and upon reaching the age limits defined in retirement benefits commitments, the Executive Board members have been granted the payments shown in Table 9.

Table 9: Retirement benefits

(in €)		Annual payment upon pension eligibility <sup>1,2,3</sup>	Lump sum payment upon pension eligibility (guarantee amount)	Allocation to pension provision		Cash value of pension entitlements	
				Pursuant to HGB	Pursuant to IFRS	Pursuant to HGB	Pursuant to IFRS
Groebler	2022	0	557,106	231,888	106,978	554,613	445,235
Regular member of the Executive Board from 2021/05/17 until 2021/06/30, Chief Executive Officer since 2021/07/01	2021	0	214,570	322,725	338,257	322,725	338,257
Becker, Chief Financial Officer since 2011/02/01	2022	357,835	753,880	1,651,384	-1,963,700	9,843,405	7,035,032
	2021	352,547	542,524	1,057,561	191,801	8,192,021	8,998,732
Kieckbusch, Chief Personnel Officer since 2013/02/20	2022	342,925	753,880	1,542,041	-2,025,531	8,784,520	6,015,067
	2021	337,857	542,524	1,032,397	204,348	7,242,479	8,040,598

<sup>1</sup> Annual entitlement during service until the age of 65, including a former employer's pension commitment assumed against remuneration.

<sup>2</sup> A cap of 96 % on the specified final pension of the financial year 2018 was contractually agreed with Mr. Becker, with dynamization as from 2019 in accordance with Essener Verband group adjustments.

<sup>3</sup> A cap of 92% of the specified final pension of the financial year 2018 was contractually agreed with Mr. Kieckbusch; dynamization as from 2019 in accordance with Essener Verband group adjustments.

Should Executive Board activities be terminated without an important reason (Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch) or without a material reason for which an Executive Board member is responsible (Mr. Groebler), the Executive Board members are entitled to the remuneration agreed until expiration of the respective contracts. This entitlement is, however, restricted to the amount of two years' remuneration (fixed and variable components (Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch) and to overall remuneration including supplementary benefits (Mr. Groebler)). In the event of premature termination of Executive Board member activities due to a change of control, the Board members are entitled under certain conditions to settlement in the amount of overall remuneration for the remaining term of their contracts of employment. This entitlement is capped at the value of three years of average overall remuneration, whereby the annual overall remuneration is to include overall remuneration including supplementary benefits (Mr. Becker and Mr. Kieckbusch) and the fixed salary and variable remuneration (Mr. Groebler).

## REMUNERATION OF FORMER EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBERS

Table 10 below shows the remuneration granted and owed in the past financial year to former Executive Board members whose service to the company ended in the last ten years, including the respective relative share pursuant to Section 162 AktG. In the financial year ended, exclusively lifetime pension payments to be remitted and remuneration for performing Supervisory Board mandates in the company's subsidiaries were granted.

Table 10: Remuneration granted and owed to former members of the Executive Board in the financial year 2022 pursuant to Section 162 AktG

	Wolfgang Eging Executive Board member Mannesmann 2003/10/01 until 2014/09/30		Prof. Dr.-Ing. Heinz-Jörg Fuhrmann Chief Financial Officer from 1996/10/01 until 2011/01/31, Chief Executive Officer from 2011/02/01 until 2021/06/30		Heinz Groschke Executive Board member Trading 2006/01/01 through 2014/09/30		Peter-Jürgen Schneider Executive Board member Personnel and Services 2003/04/01 until 2013/02/19	
	in €	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %
Share deferral (2019)	0	0%	337,500	22%	0	0%	0	0%
Performance cash award 2019	0	0%	450,000	30%	0	0%	0	0%
Pension payments	358,720	99%	736,920	48%	397,644	96%	140,019	100%
Supervisory Board remuneration	2,599	1%	0	0%	17,616	4%	0	0%
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>361,319</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,524,420</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>415,261</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>140,019</b>	<b>100%</b>

## REMUNERATION OF SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

### SUPERVISORY BOARD REMUNERATION SYSTEM

Each member of the Supervisory Board receives a fixed remuneration of € 60,000 per financial year. This remuneration is double the amount for the Vice Chairman and three times the amount for the Chairman. In addition, each member receives € 5,000 for committee activities, each committee chairman and each member of the Audit Committee € 10,000, and the chairman of the Audit Committee € 30,000. The Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the Vice Chairman are not remunerated for membership in the committees. The other Supervisory Board members are compensated for a maximum of two memberships in committees. An attendance fee of € 500 is paid for participation in each Supervisory Board meeting (also by way of telephone or video conference); participation in a brief telephone consultation and decision making by way of telephone do not count insofar as participating in a meeting.

**REMUNERATION RECEIVED BY THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD:**

The individual members of the Supervisory Board received the following remuneration and attendance fees:

Table 11: Remuneration of Supervisory Board members in the financial year 2022

		Fixed remuneration		Remuneration for committee duties		Attendance fees		Annual entitlements
		in €	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %	Total remuneration
								in €
Heinz-Gerhard Wente (Chairman)	2022	180,000	97%	0	0%	5,000	3%	185,000
	2021	180,000	98%	0	0%	3,500	2%	183,500
Dr. Hans-Jürgen Urban (Vice Chairman)	2022	120,000	96%	0	0%	5,000	4%	125,000
	2021	120,000	97%	0	0%	3,500	3%	123,500
Konrad Ackermann	2022	60,000	74%	15,000	19%	6,000	7%	81,000
	2021	60,000	77%	15,000	19%	3,000	4%	78,000
Manuel Bloemers (since 2021/07/01)	2022	60,000	75%	15,000	19%	5,000	6%	80,000
	2021	30,000	80%	5,000	13%	2,500	7%	37,500
Ulrike Brouzi	2022	60,000	95%	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2021	60,000	98%	0	0%	1,500	2%	61,500
Annelie Buntenbach (until 2021/06/30)	2022	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0
	2021	30,000	98%	0	0%	500	2%	30,500
Hasan Cakir	2022	60,000	80%	10,000	13%	5,000	7%	75,000
	2021	60,000	83%	10,000	14%	2,500	3%	72,500
Dr. Bernd Drouven	2022	60,000	88%	5,000	7%	3,500	5%	68,500
	2021	60,000	89%	5,000	7%	2,500	4%	67,500
Roland Flach	2022	60,000	79%	10,000	13%	5,500	7%	75,500
	2021	60,000	82%	10,000	14%	3,000	4%	73,000
Gabriele Handke	2022	60,000	95%	0	0%	3,000	5%	63,000
	2021	60,000	97%	0	0%	2,000	3%	62,000
Reinhold Hilbers	2022	60,000	80%	10,000	13%	5,000	7%	75,000
	2021	60,000	82%	10,000	14%	3,000	4%	73,000
Norbert Keller	2022	60,000	96%	0	0%	2,500	4%	62,500
	2021	60,000	97%	0	0%	2,000	3%	62,000



		Annual entitlements						
		Fixed remuneration		Remuneration for committee duties		Attendance fees	Total remuneration	
Frank Klingebiel (since 2021/05/19)	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0 %	3,000	5 %	63,000
	2021	40,000	96 %	0	0 %	1,500	4 %	41,500
Prof. Dr. Susanne Knorre	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0 %	3,000	5 %	63,000
	2021	60,000	97 %	0	0 %	2,000	3 %	62,000
Dr. Dieter Köster (until 2021/06/30)	2022	0	0 %	0	0 %	0	0 %	0
	2021	30,000	98 %	0	0 %	500	2 %	30,500
Heinz Kreuzer	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0 %	3,000	5 %	63,000
	2021	60,000	97 %	0	0 %	2,000	3 %	62,000
Bernd Lauenroth (until 2021/06/30)	2022	0	0 %	0	0 %	0	0 %	0
	2021	30,000	79 %	7,500	20 %	500	1 %	38,000
Volker Mittelstädt	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0 %	3,000	5 %	63,000
	2021	60,000	97 %	0	0 %	2,000	3 %	62,000
Klaus Papenburg (since 2021/07/01)	2022	60,000	90 %	3,333	5 %	3,500	5 %	66,833
	2021	30,000	95 %	0	0 %	1,500	5 %	31,500
Anja Piel (since 2021/07/22)	2022	60,000	97 %	0	0 %	2,000	3 %	62,000
	2021	30,000	95 %	0	0 %	1,500	5 %	31,500
Prof. Dr. Joachim Schindler	2022	60,000	63 %	30,000	31 %	5,500	6 %	95,500
	2021	60,000	65 %	30,000	32 %	3,000	3 %	93,000
Christine Seemann	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0 %	3,000	5 %	63,000
	2021	60,000	97 %	0	0 %	2,000	3 %	62,000
Prof. Dr. Dr.-Ing. Birgit Spanner-Ulmer	2022	60,000	90 %	5,000	7 %	2,000	3 %	67,000
	2021	60,000	89 %	5,000	7 %	2,500	4 %	67,500
Clemens Spiller	2022	60,000	95 %	0	0 %	3,000	5 %	63,000
	2021	60,000	97 %	0	0 %	2,000	3 %	62,000
Dr. Werner Tegtmeier (until 2021/05/19)	2022	0	0 %	0	0 %	0	0 %	0
	2021	25,000	98 %	0	0 %	500	2 %	25,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>1,440,000</b>		<b>103,333</b>		<b>79,500</b>		<b>1,622,833</b>
	<b>2021</b>	<b>1,445,000</b>		<b>97,500</b>		<b>51,000</b>		<b>1,593,500</b>

In addition, the following Supervisory Board members received remuneration for Supervisory Board mandates of subsidiaries:

Table 12: Remuneration of Supervisory Board members serving at subsidiaries in the financial year 2022

		Annual entitlements						
		Fixed remuneration		Remuneration for committee duties		Attendance fees		Total remuneration
		in €	in %	in €	in %	in €	in %	in €
Konrad Ackermann (KHS)	2022	10,000	91 %	0	0 %	1,000	9 %	11,000
	2021	10,000	93 %	0	0 %	750	7 %	10,750
Hasan Cakir (SZFG)	2022	8,000	94 %	0	0 %	500	6 %	8,500
	2021	8,000	95 %	0	0 %	400	5 %	8,400
Roland Flach (KHS)	2022	10,000	91 %	0	0 %	1,000	9 %	11,000
	2021	10,000	93 %	0	0 %	750	7 %	10,750
Gabriele Handke (PTG)	2022	5,000	93 %	0	0 %	400	7 %	5,400
	2021	5,000	93 %	0	0 %	400	7 %	5,400
Norbert Keller (MPTDE)	2022	2,084	95 %	0	0 %	100	5 %	2,184
	2021	5,000	94 %	0	0 %	300	6 %	5,300
Volker Mittelstädt (ILG/MGB)	2022	7,500	95 %	0	0 %	400	5 %	7,900
	2021	7,500	95 %	0	0 %	400	5 %	7,900
Dr. Hans-Jürgen Urban (SZFG)	2022	12,000	96 %	0	0 %	500	4 %	12,500
	2021	12,000	97 %	0	0 %	400	3 %	12,400
<b>Total</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>54,584</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>3,900</b>		<b>58,484</b>
	<b>2021</b>	<b>57,500</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>3,400</b>		<b>60,900</b>

The employee representatives who are members of trade unions have declared that they will remit their remuneration to the Hans Böckler Foundation in accordance with the provisions of the German Trade Union Confederation.

## COMPARATIVE CHART OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS TREND

The following comparative chart illustrates the year-on-year change in remuneration granted and owed to current and former members of the Executive Board and of the Supervisory Board, the company's earnings trend and employee remuneration based on full-time equivalents.

The remuneration of members of the Executive Board and of the Supervisory Board corresponds to the remuneration granted and owed in the respective financial years within the meaning of Section 162 (1) sentence 1 AktG and therefore to the disclosures in Tables 1 and 10 as well as 11 and 12 of this report. Along with the development of Salzgitter AG's annual net income, key indicators for the earnings trend also include consolidated earnings before taxes (EBT) that also functions as an assessment basis for the financial performance component as part of the annual bonus. The core workforce of the Salzgitter Group's companies domiciled in Germany was taken as a basis for assessing employee remuneration development. The internal group used for comparison purposes was deliberately restricted to Germany as the majority of the workforce (around 80 %) are employed here and because structural changes over time in the proportion of staff members employed abroad in the overall workforce would skew the informative value of a representative comparison on a global scale.

Table 13 shows a comparison of the percentage change in Executive Board member remuneration and Salzgitter AG's earning trend against the average employee remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis, compared with the previous year. Table 14 illustrates this comparison for members of the Supervisory Board.

Table 13: Comparison of the remuneration and earnings trend for members of the Executive Board (year-on-year change respectively)

	2022	2021
<b>Current members of the Executive Board</b>		
Groeblner	31%	(start of employment in 2021)
Becker	55%	37%
Kieckbusch	51%	29%
<b>Former members of the Executive Board</b>		
Eging	2%	-2%
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Fuhrmann	-16%	27%
Groschke	1%	-1%
Schneider	2%	0%
<b>Earnings trend</b>		
SZAG annual result (HGB)	23%	(turnaround 2021 versus 2020)
Earnings before taxes (EBT) Salzgitter Group (IFRS)	76%	(turnaround 2021 versus 2020)
<b>Employees</b>		
Domestic workforce	6%	12%


The increase in the remuneration granted and owed in 2022 to Chief Executive Officer Mr. Groeblner is mainly attributable to the fact that Mr. Groeblner only joined the executive Board on May 17, 2021, and that remuneration for 2021 was therefore granted on an accruals basis. Along with the increase in fixed salary, the higher level of remuneration granted and owed to the two Executive Board members Messrs Becker and Kieckbusch is especially due to the fact that the multi-year remuneration components consisting of the share deferral and performance cash award granted for the first time in the financial year 2019 were owed after the end of the financial year 2022. Since these long-term remuneration components were only introduced into the currently valid Executive Board remuneration system in the financial year 2019, no multi-year variable remuneration was granted and owed in the financial year 2021. Moreover, in the case of Mr. Becker, the temporary granting of additional remuneration amounting to k€ 120 (2021: k€ 60) for assuming the position of head of the Mannesmann Business Unit raised his remuneration. The significant increase in the average employee remuneration in the financial year 2022 compared with the financial year 2021 is essentially attributable to another earnings-related significant increase in the performance-based remuneration owed for the financial year 2022, notable wage increases from collective bargaining, as well as a voluntary granting of a bonus €1,000 per employee to compensate for inflation.

Table 14: Comparison of the remuneration and earnings trend for members of the Supervisory Board (year-on-year change respectively)


	2022	2021
<b>Current members of the Supervisory Board</b>		
Heinz-Gerhard Wente (Chairman)	1%	5%
Dr. Hans-Jürgen Urban (Vice Chairman)	1%	6%
Konrad Ackermann	4%	4%
Manuel Bloemers (since 2021/07/01)	113%	(start 2021)
Ulrike Brouzi	2%	6%
Hasan Cakir	3%	4%
Dr. Bernd Drouven	1%	8%
Roland Flach	3%	5%
Gabriele Handke	1%	6%
Reinhold Hilbers	3%	5%
Norbert Keller	-4%	8%
Frank Klingebiel (since 2021/05/19)	52%	(start 2021)
Prof. Dr. Susanne Knorre	2%	6%
Heinz Kreuzer	2%	6%
Volker Mittelstädt	1%	6%
Klaus Papenburg (since 2021/07/01)	112%	(start 2021)
Anja Piel (since 2021/07/22)	97%	(start 2021)
Prof. Dr. Joachim Schindler	3%	5%
Christine Seemann	2%	6%
Prof. Dr. Dr.-Ing. Birgit Spanner-Ulmer	-1%	7%
Clemens Spiller	2%	6%

<b>Former members of the Supervisory Board</b>		
Annelie Buntенbach (until 2021/06/30)	-	-48%
Dr. Dieter Köster (until 2021/06/30)	-	-47%
Bernd Lauenroth (until 2021/06/30)	-	-49%
Dr. Werner Tegtmeier (until 2021/05/19)	-	-56%
<b>Earnings trend</b>		
SZAG annual result (HGB)	23%	(turnaround 2021)
Earnings before taxes (EBT) Salzgitter Group (IFRS)	76%	(turnaround 2021)
<b>Employees</b>		
Domestic workforce	6%	12%


Salzgitter, March 23, 2023



**(Gunnar Groebler)**  
Chairman of the Executive  
Board and CEO



**(Burkhard Becker)**  
Member of the Executive Board  
Finance



**(Heinz-Gerhard Wente)**  
Chairman of the Supervisory  
Board